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This revised Islamic legal system will bring about the "revival of the Islamic legislative credibility." Modern formulation of sharica should be entrusted to universities, with lay scholarly supervision. Otherwise, "sharia will wither away and we shall finally have abdicated our trust."6 Historically, reasoning and reinterpretation (ijtihdd) had been manipulated by despotic Muslim rulers for their own purposes, which brought about the uncritical adoption of legal decisions through imitation (taqlld) and discouraged new interpretations by learned jurists. Sadiq believed that "the regime of taqlld is responsible for destroying the inner vitality and purposefulness of the Islamic ummah and so preparing it for foreign domination." He demonstrated the flexibility of Islam in various spheres and claimed that in Islamic government only two conditions had to be applied: a set of general principles needed to organize society politically, and the application of Islamic legislation. He stated that "any system which fulfills those two conditions is entitled to be called Islamic." In the legislative sphere Islam can also accommodate change due to the fact that out of 6,000 verses of the Qur'an, only 245 deal with the aspects of social legislation. Of these 70 are concerned with personal affairs, 70 with civil and financial matters, 30 with criminal offenses, 30 with adjudication and witnessing, 10 with economic affairs, 10 with constitutional issues, and 25 with international affairs. "Thus in Islam while religion is integral to politics and society, there is a distinction between that which is immutable and that which is subject to change and development." A high degree of flexibility is possible even when legislation is based on explicit holy texts, such as the hudud (unalterable punishments prescribed by shari'a) or the fara'id (fixed shares in an estate). In both there are circumstantial considerations that can be applied by the learned jurists, through consensus, analogy, or preference, in order to postpone or qualify their application.
In the economic sphere there were two general principles that had to be applied: first, wealth is collectively owned by mankind and private ownership is only legitimate if accumulated through one's efforts, whereas society is bound to provide for the poor; second, the establishment of special injunctions such as zakat (a tax levied on cattle and crops authorized by shari'a), inheritance laws, the prohibition of usury, and so on. Thus, there is no contradiction between Islam and a modern economic system. Islamic international relations, according to Sadiq, were based on peaceful coexistence with other people and justified war only to deter aggression and not as a way to enforce Islam. Even pagans were not converted by force: "Those who claim that jihad is enforced Islamization cite Sura 9:5 for support: 'fight and slay the pagans whenever ye find them."' But, claims Sadiq, this Sura refers to a particular "treacherous group of pagans who betrayed the Prophet and initiated violence." Islamic international relations are based on five principles: human brotherhood, the supremacy of justice, the binding character of all contracts and trusts, and reciprocity in the conduct of relations.7 Islamic states may be traditional, modernizing, or revolutionary as long as they abide by Islamic constitutional principles, base their legal systems on sharica, and treat human beings with honor and justice. Western views that Islam is fatalistic and has encouraged despotism and stagnation are totally mistaken. These mistaken ideas were based on three historical encounters between Islam and Christianitythe Andalusian, the Crusades, and the Ottoman-which resulted in fear and misunderstanding. Orientalism had also led to misconceived ideas of Only circumstances prevailing in the Islamic world help to explain how this alien phenomenon emerged. First, whereas Islam had pioneered freedom and human rights at its inception, it has fallen behind in modern times. Second, the Arab Muslim world today leads in social injustice. Third, Muslim sensitivities to honor and self-esteem have been overshadowed by the cultural and ideological attacks launched against it. Hence, while other nations have moved toward stability and moderation, Muslims have been left behind and are craving stability. Fourth, Muslims, as part of the poor south, are discriminated against in all spheres by the rich north. Finally, the robbing of Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim rights by Zionist aggression has led to continuous anger in the Arab Muslim world. These five causes, according to Sadiq, have bred extremism, and there will always be some who will clothe violence in a religious garb. Therefore, once in power, as in some of the Arab countries at present, the Islamists tear the body politic apart, leading to frustration and enabling the international community to justify intervention. In May 1986, realizing the advantages the Muslim Brothers had gained as a result of better organization, finances, and tactics, the Umma Party and the Khatmiyyaoriented Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) signed the Sudanese Charter of National Unity, which called for the adoption of an Islamic constitution and demanded the abrogation of all the laws passed by the Numayri regime, "particularly the laws of September 1983 which were promulgated in the name of Islam and which were a falsification of Islam, the expression of absolutist power and an affront to human dignity." Sadiq and his colleagues demanded that religious laws such as the forbidding of alcoholic beverages or of eating pork should be imposed only on Muslims and that a similar attitude be adopted with regard to zakat. Taxes should be levied on all citizens according to a nonreligious law decreed by the state, and discriminatory taxes such as the jizya (poll tax levied on non-Muslims) should be abolished. Islam should, however, be declared the religion of the state and the shari'a its major source of legislation, since the majority of Sudanese were Muslims. Sadiq agreed to maintain traditional sources of positive law but insisted that sharica was superior and more suitable for the cultural and social realities of Sudan. In Sadiq's view the south would ultimately become fully Arabized and Islamized. This would come about through the assimilation of tribes, the impact of Muslim Sufis, jurisprudents and merchants settling in the south, and economic projects emanating from the north and benefitting the south. Finally, the massive settlement of southerners in the north would make them recognize that imperialism and "white civilization" were the common enemy. This recognition had convinced even black Americans to embrace Islam and thus would certainly bring about the Islamization of the south.'2 In August 1992 Sadiq published a new brochure listing the lessons to be learned from the conflict between north and south and his proposals for a just peace in Sudan. In it he reiterates many of his earlier ideas and adds a few new ones. First, Sadiq proposes a seven-point program leading to peace. He suggests a plebiscite to determine the extent of decentralization, between regionalism, federation, or confederation. Legislation will be carried out democratically and will respect the limits set by decentralization. Development will be planned in accordance with regional and sectional needs, and all national groups will participate in administration, defense, and security, taking into account the needs of "technical competence." Foreign policy will be based on regional and international charters, and will uphold "Arab, African, and Islamic solidarity ... in a balanced way."13 It is noteworthy that Sadiq refrains from calling for Islamization of the south, which he had advocated in the past and which the NIF continues to enforce at present. Whether this is a change in policy or an opportunistic attempt to seek southern support remains unclear. Second, the proposed bill of rights, as suggested by Sadiq, seeks to guarantee equality of Muslims and others regardless of religion, ethnicity, or culture. Finally, Sadiq rejects partition as one of the options put forward by sections within the NIF, claiming that it would inevitably lead to the emergence of two hostile states and be unacceptable to the majority of Sudanese. Students Unity Front and even risked a showdown with the regime. A first split within the NF followed the failure of the August-September 1973 uprising, which had been centered at the university and consequently harmed the Brothers. They accused the NF of letting them down, whereas Sadiq claimed that the Brothers had acted on their own in order to boost their declining popularity. An indirect result of this split was that after 1975, Turabi and most of his followers supported a pragmatic policy and opposed the attempts to overthrow Numayri that were planned and executed by the NF leadership from its headquarters in exile.22 Turabi, therefore, had no difficulty in cooperating with Numayri once the latter changed course in 1977. This enabled the Brothers to gain first-hand experience with the state apparatus, legislation, and media and gave them easy access to state funds. They had no qualms in rushing to support whatever positions the government proposed. Although a minority within the Brother's shrad constantly opposed this pragmatic approach, the majority led by Turabi were soon fully identified with the regime. In 1979, Turabi himself was appointed attorney general, and his colleagues accepted positions in the judiciary and the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). An important aspect of their collaboration with Numayri was their penetration into the armed forces, which they realized was crucial if they hoped to achieve power. This was openly admitted by Rashid al-Ghanushi, one of the Brothers' leaders, who in 1979 stated that an unacceptable regime should be removed by military force, if all else had failed. Because Islamists viewed their route to power by peaceful means as blocked by the regime, they justified penetrating the army and subsequently using it to achieve their aim. There were several routes into the armed forces. First, the Brothers were invited by Numayri to conduct religious teaching and prayers within the army. Second, they urged their student members to join the army officers corps upon graduation from their engineering, accountancy, or medical studies. Since graduates in these fields rarely volunteered for military service, the Brothers gained a strong influence within these branches. A third method entailed the search for ex-Brothers who served in the army in order to lure them back into the movement. All this took place during the years 1978-85, when conditions within Sudan were ripe for revolt.23
Turabi, continuing his pragmatism, supported Numayri's so-called Islamic laws in September 1983. He had not been directly involved in their final formulation; he realized their shortcomings and admitted that they were neither Islamic nor was the manner in which they had been imposed constitutional. Yet he dismissed the claim of certain Muslim leaders that one cannot impose morality by law, stating that similar objections could be raised against any law. The hudud, according to Turabi, were part of an educational process whereby the state hoped to improve the morals of its citizens.24 Turabi had an additional reason for lending his support because he knew that the regular courts would refuse to implement the Islamic laws, which had not been ratified constitutionally. Numayri's newly established "prompt courts," presided over by his Sufi mentors and the Muslim Brothers, were ordered to implement these laws and did so eagerly. Many top government officials, including ex-army officers, were brought before these courts and humiliated publicly to the delight of the crowds. The Muslim Brothers thereby enjoyed power for the first time in their history, and many of the small Sufi orders joined in 
